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common trap of putting modern connotations into the mouths of historical figures,
even though he was trying to avoid doing so.
The following changes should be incorporated into an English version, for which
there is a real need. First, it would be desirable to avoid listing bibliographical
references in footnotes. This practice disrupts the rhythm of the narrative of the
text. According to standard writing style, Ferreiro´s should cite authors in the main
body of the text, followed by the year of the publication in brackets. Second, it is
imperative to stop indicating footnotes with numbers in parenthesis; they should
be typed simply as superscript characters in order to avoid possible confusion with
mathematical formulas (p. 179). Third, footnotes should begin with 1 (one) on
every page, to avoid the use of high numbers near the end of each chapter. This
would make the text easier to read. Fourth, and most important, it is essential to
include a general thematic index at the end of the book. Like some other Spanish
printing houses, Ediciones UAM decided to save money (and time) at the expense
of one of the most indispensable tools of any book.
Finally, as we know, every book has its own history. No doubt, this monograph
is the result of a long, well-planned, and well-designed process of research and
writing. Perhaps, one day, Jose´ Ferreiro´s might tell us the story, as an anecdote to
the discipline, of how a footnote—typed in English—found its way into the original
Spanish edition (p. 72, note 30). There is a second footnote printed in German
(p. 87, note 73), but perhaps, in this case, Ferreiro´s’s intention was to provide us
with the original text.
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Sobel’s recent bestseller Longitude [3] brought to a wide public the account of
a major scientific problem of the 18th century, the accurate determination of time,
and hence of longitude, while at sea. John Greenberg presents another 18th-century
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frontier of exploration, the determination of the earth’s shape. Superficially the
contrast could hardly be greater: Sobel’s engaging and informative light read is a
world apart from Greenberg’s long and densely written treatise on the history of
mechanics and mathematics. Greenberg provides plenty of summaries and over-
views throughout the book in which results that are new to the history of the subject
are often indicated, and there is probably enough human drama threaded through
the account on which to base a bestseller—even though the perilous arc-measuring
expeditions of the time play no significant role in this account; but skimming these
passages could give an entirely misleading impression of the nature and value of
the work as a whole. From a closer reading this reviewer, for example, gained more
of an understanding of what Newton’s Principia did for science than from any other
work in the history of science that he has read. This is because the author takes
very little for granted; the reader, rather than taking in a predigested rewriting or
summary of what Alexis-Claude Clairaut made of Newton, for example, must
grapple with the same difficulties in Clairaut and Clairaut’s understanding of Newton
that Greenberg found. The effect of this explication de texte is to make Greenberg
the historian transparent and to give a feeling of immediacy to the subject matter
comparable to that found in Longitude.
The history of the solution to the problem of the shape of the earth has been
treated as a textbook example of how a paradigm shift occurs, in this case from
the Cartesian worldview to the Newtonian. Newton’s Principia came to France in
the 1730s and with it Newton’s view of the earth as slightly flattened at the poles,
based on his interpretation of certain observations of pendulum experiments. The
dominant view in Paris at the time, based on different sorts of observations, was
that the earth was elongated at the poles. We know Newtonian science has to win
out in the end, but the story when viewed at Greenberg’s detailed level challenges
any attempt to fit the account into a grand historiographical thesis about how shifts
or revolutions within a so-called ‘‘normal’’ science happen. The difficulty in simply
trying to understand what Newton wrote in the Principia, for readers in the 1730s
or readers today, is only one of the complications usually overlooked in historical
textbook accounts. Another complication is the interplay between mathematics and
physics that has only recently been the subject of broad studies by historians: a
substantial treatise by Dahan Dalmedico [1] and an even more substantial one by
Grattan-Guinness [2]. If we insist on referring to a takeover by Newtonianism in
France, for example, Greenberg wishes us to know that it was a takeover that would
not have been possible without discoveries in mathematics and mechanics made
almost wholly within France itself and, in the key instances, made by people who
could hardly be counted as ‘‘Newtonians.’’
The story of the creation of the calculus of several variables, which is a principal
thread of this account, has already been told by historians, including Greenberg
who in earlier papers particularly emphasized Fontaine’s underrated contributions.
But, at least in the case of Clairaut and Fontaine, nothing approaching a complete
presentation of the mathematical and social context has been given before the
present book. Readers acquainted with reputation-threatening controversies be-
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tween scholars today might nevertheless be hard put to appreciate the impact of
Clairaut’s mainly technical criticism of what he regarded as the needless formalism
of Fontaine’s ‘‘fluxio-differential’’ method. That even the brilliant Clairaut, for
whom the Academy had already made an exception by admitting him in 1731 at
the young age of 18, could publish his criticism of Fontaine in the Academy’s
Me´moires, an unprecedented allowance (or oversight), is only one indication that
more may have been at stake than we can ever realize. His criticism appears to
have contributed to Fontaine’s downfall over the next 30 years from his once high
respectability in the Paris scientific circle. In the concluding chapter Greenberg
recounts the fascinatingly complicated story of Fontaine’s mistreatment by the
Academy and by the larger European establishment, compounded by Fontaine’s
own misjudgments or lapses. The philosophe Diderot and the philosophe–
mathematician D’Alembert were involved, as well as Condorcet, Lagrange, and
the historian–mathematician Cousin.
The stage for the Clairaut–Fontaine clash was set by the controversy in the 1720s
between the Frenchman J.-J. D. de Mairan and Newton’s chief experimenter, J. T.
Desaguliers, a Huguenot refugee in England. This is usually pictured in terms of
a contention between clear national scientific paradigms. Though Mairan does make
use of the vortices of Descartes (and of Huygens) in arguing for an elongated earth,
Greenberg points out that such references are not central and that Mairan is very
much the experimenter and more concerned with ‘‘the fine details of phenomena’’—
while Cartesians, as Greenberg ironically puts it, were not ‘‘particularly renowned
for an interest in such things’’ (p. 50). Desaguliers gave a vigorous but somewhat
confused rejoinder to Mairan’s me´moire in the 1725 Philosophical Transactions of
the Royal Society of London. Contrary to some previous historical opinion,
Greenberg finds no sign that his response inspired the Parisians to take to the
ramparts in defense. Rather, the Paris Academician P.-L. Moreau de Maupertuis
was principally responsible for raising the status of the issue in Paris. By 1733
Maupertuis came to see the solution as lying in geodesic measurements, and he came
to this position under the influence of sources other than Mairan and Desaguliers: the
Paduan scholar Giovanni Poleni, who proposed to measure the earth’s shape by
longitudinal measurements, and a Dutch reviewer of Poleni’s work, probably Elie
de Joncourt, who introduced new equations for determining the earth’s ellipticity.
As Greenberg summarizes the state of play at this point:
Not only Newton’s universal inverse-square law of attraction but all of the leading hypotheses
of attraction of the day together with the principle of balanced columns applied to homogeneous
figures of revolution which revolved around their axes of symmetry required that such figures
of revolution be flattened. Such results, however, contradicted the findings of Jacques Cassini
and his colleagues, who deduced from measured variations of degrees of latitude with latitude
in France along the meridian through Paris that the earth was shaped like an elongated ellipsoid
of revolution. Maupertuis urged a renewed effort to determine the ‘‘facts of the matter,’’ rather
than to dwell upon competing, speculative theories (p. 80).
The next Paris academician to play a role in this story is Pierre Bouguer who
showed in 1734 that two key principles used in all previous arguments, the principle
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of balanced columns and the principle of the plumb line, were not interrelated. He
seems to have taken up this problem through a reading of Mairan’s 1720 me´moire.
Bouguer was the immediate cause for Maupertuis’s reading before the Paris Acad-
emy of a paper in 1734 on the problem of homogeneous figures of equilibrium.
Johann I Bernoulli and his son Daniel had that year won the Paris Academy prize
for papers on planetary orbits in which ‘‘for the first time, someone [Johann I]
claimed to establish a connection between Cartesian physics and an earth whose
shape is elongated’’ (p. 107; see also p. 557).
Academician Clairaut, the lead player in this history, first published on the issue
in 1737 while on the Academy-sponsored expedition for measuring arc in Lapland.
He intended not only to show Newton’s weaknesses but to patch them up, the most
glaring one being the lack of any evident connection between Newton’s positing
of a shape flattened at the poles and his gravitational theory. But the analytical
tools for filling this gap, as it turns out, were not yet available. It is an interesting
aside in Greenberg’s account that Colin MacLaurin’s influential paper of 1740 on
the attraction of ellipsoids was able, using rigorous even if geometrical methods,
to determine the values of gravitational attraction at any point on the surface of
this sort of figure for the earth. Though Clairaut in his later work used MacLaurin’s
geometry-based results, because the calculus did not develop the means to do the
equivalent until after the period he is covering here, Greenberg does not give a
detailed treatment of this aspect of Clairaut’s mathematics. (This is an ‘‘aside,’’ like
many others in The Problem of the Earth’s Shape, only in a relative sense: the
description of MacLaurin’s relation to Clairaut amounts here to an original and
informative paper (pp. 412–425, 577–600).) The focus in the bulk of the book
is on the mathematics that came to be necessary for investigating the necessary
equilibrium conditions for stratified fluid figures. Isaac Todhunter’s classic history
[4] simply assumes the mathematics was somehow already at hand and excludes
concomitant issues like work on the theory of the tides.
At this point Greenberg introduces the relevant developments of the integral
calculus that began with Leibniz and Johann I Bernoulli in the 1690s. This interlude
to the main story provides a substantial history of partial differential equations
and describes the international communications that allowed Paris, left out of
developments for some time because of its isolation by war and unfavorable ex-
change rates, finally to succeed by 1740 in catching up with the rest of Europe in
this field. (There are also reverberations of that other clash of national cultures:
the Leibniz–Newton controversy.) Many of the names are familiar from histories
of the calculus, but some who are most important for this account are perhaps not
so well known in this connection: P.-R. de Montmort, Franc¸ois Nicole, and Louis-
Bertrand Castel (the latter a fascinating Jesuit active in trying to humanize mathe-
matics). Alexis Fontaine’s ‘‘fluxio-differential’’ method, applied to the brachisto-
chrone problem, is introduced here. While Clairaut may be unavoidably at the
center of this history, Greenberg gives equally detailed attention to Fontaine, whose
methods were praised by no less than Euler in 1742 (p. 281) and were held up in
effect as a model by a 20th-century mechanics textbook (p. 326). In a choice piece
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of detective work Greenberg reconstructs and analyzes a key paper Fontaine read
to the Academy in 1738, the reconstruction being based on a report of the paper
made by Clairaut and Nicole (pp. 330–347).
Finally, about midway through the book, the central part of the story begins.
None of the preceding account is superfluous: the most intriguing aspects of
Clairaut’s move forward are how the partial differential calculus came to play its
leading role in his work and how much of an influence Fontaine’s version of this
calculus had in making this possible. The case is made that even though Clairaut had
earlier expressed his principles that were necessary conditions for the equilibrium of
homogeneous figures, he did not present his mathematical formulation of them
until after he had become acquainted with Fontaine’s 1738 work. (The sufficient
conditions for equilibrium were developed later and are outside the time period
of the book.) The bulk of the account, however, is devoted to a step-by-step analysis
of Clairaut’s 1743 treatise which set out the main lines of argument—building upon
principles concerning homogeneous figures to move to heterogeneous figures—that
were to be followed by virtually all subsequent people who took up the subject.
Other issues that arise are: the delay of the French in learning of Euler’s work and
the influence Euler and Clairaut had on each other (pp. 366–370, 545–554); the
resistance of Clairaut—‘‘at heart a geometer, in the contemporary sense of the
word’’—to the method of varying parameters to determine the behavior of a family
of curves (pp. 388–390); the 1740 Academy contest on the cause of the tides for
which Clairaut was one of the judges and through which he came to develop a
close working relationship with Daniel Bernoulli, one of the prize winners (pp.
400–412); Clairaut’s development of the line integral as the way to calculate the
total ‘‘effort’’ (or elementary work) produced by attraction along a curved channel
of fluid interior to a fluid figure of revolution (especially pp. 457–463); the subtle
issues raised by singularities and multiple-valued functions that Clairaut stumbled
over (p. 479–482); the implicit and explicit links between Bouguer’s 1734 work and
Clairaut’s of 1743 (pp. 438–441, 522–529); and D’Alembert’s analysis of parts of
Clairaut’s treatise (pp. 537–541). The account stops essentially when Clairaut gave
up the topic of the earth’s shape, but not before presenting another theory about
it in 1750. This differed from the 1743 theory mainly in its hypothesis of an irregularly
shaped solid nucleus which would reconcile Newton’s inverse-square law of gravita-
tional attraction with the observations of that time. This meant, however, no longer
treating the earth as a figure in equilibrium.
In Clairaut’s 1743 treatise the usual difficulties involved in a close analysis of a
text arise: diagrams that do not always match the arguments in the text, assumptions
on occasion of the thing ostensibly being proved, and surprisingly straightforward
mistakes. In the course of explicating, untangling, and oftentimes correcting this
and other texts, and trying to make his analysis less ambiguous than the originals,
Greenberg not infrequently felt it necessary to ignore the reader-friendly rules that
mathematical writers are encouraged to follow today. This reviewer noted one
sentence over a page long whose meaning becomes clear only with patient parsing
(pp. 157–158). Greenberg’s reading of difficult and overlooked texts such as the
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1722 publication of Mairan’s me´moire on the earth’s figure—he could well be the
first person in over two hundred years to have studied it at all carefully—is, of
course, what an historian has to do; but this only prepares the way for the next
task, trying to understand how Mairan’s contemporaries understood his work.
Greenberg has not only done justice to this unending task for each of the major
works in the compass of his study, he has in the process revealed how superficial
readings or deliberate misrepresentations by contemporaries may have misled later
historians who relied on such secondary accounts. His richly multileveled story
contains many such lessons.
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Kusch’s book deserves the attention of historians of mathematics for three rea-
sons. One is its subject matter, which deals with the relations between philosophy
and psychology in Germany, 1880–1920. This is the period of Husserl, Frege, and
Wundt, all of whom had much to say on the nature of logic, mathematics, and
indeed on the nature of knowledge, and influenced the debates on the foundations
of mathematics that were at their height during this period. Wundt is perhaps less
familiar to us than the others, but it was he who was most influential on Enriques,
for example.
All three are at the center of this book. Much philosophy this century, especially
in the Anglo-Saxon tradition (but not the German one!), accepts a distinction
between philosophy and psychology which amounts to a victory of philosophy over
psychology and is popularly attributed to Frege and Husserl. Kusch shows that this
consensus can only be understood if it is pursued historically, and indeed that it is
frail and has been open to many interpretations. These interpretations are not
